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1 Introduction
We consider the problem of a society of voters selecting from a finite set of alternatives under
single-peaked preferences when ties between adjacent alternatives are possible. The classical
result by Moulin (1980) shows that, when ties are not allowed and voters’ are restricted to
report their preferred alternative –their peaks–, the family of voting rules that satisfy strategy-
proofness is characterized by a generalization of the selection of the median of the reported
peaks. Barberà et al. (1993) extend the analysis to multidimensional spaces of alternatives
and show that every single-valued voting rule that satisfies strategy-proofness and unanimity
only uses the information contained in the peaks reported by the voters.
Despite the natural appeal of median rules, it could be argued that sometimes they may
fail to provide an optimal compromise between the conflicting interests of the voters. Think
of a society with 100 voters, 50 voters vote for alternative a, 50 voters vote for b. A median
voter rule would choose either a or b, but the choice of an alternative in between a or b
may seem more adequate. In the case that there is no alternative in between a and b, we
could consider the possibility of selecting both alternatives, pending the final selection to an
eventual screening process after additional information is obtained.
The previous observation drives our attention to voting rules that take into account voters’
preferences to select either a single alternative or a pair of adjacent alternatives. We require
that such rules satisfy strategy-proofness and unanimity. Since the rules admit the selection
of sets of alternatives, voters’ preferences over alternatives do not contain enough informa-
tion to compare the possible outcomes of the social choice. Thus, voters’ preferences over
alternatives must be extended to preferences over sets of alternatives. We assume that each
voter ranks any pair of adjacent alternatives in between the two alternatives that form the pair.
Under this assumption, we define an auxiliary order on the set of possible outcomes and show
that voters’ preferences over outcomes are single-peaked with respect to that auxiliary order,
but the preferences are restricted to have the peak on a single alternative. We show that the
main results in Moulin (1980) and Barberà et al. (1993) can be extended to this subdomain
of single-peaked preferences. The contribution of this note relies on providing the precise
additional arguments required in the proofs by Moulin (1980) and Barberà et al. (1993) to
apply in the subdomain generated when ties between adjacent alternatives are admissible.
There is a bast literature analyzing either multivalued social choice rules or the domain
of single-peaked preferences as ways to avoid the negative conclusions of the Gibbard–
Satterthwaite Theorem (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975). We refer the reader to Barberà
(2011) for a comprehensive survey. There are a few papers however, that deal with multival-
ued social choice rules under single-peaked preferences. Miyagawa (1998, 2001), Ehlers and
Gordon (2013), and Heo (2013) consider the problem of locating two public facilities in a
line when each voter may attend one facility. Klaus and Storcken (2002) consider the choice
of intervals of alternatives in multidimensional spaces. All those papers consider different
restrictions on feasible sets and on preferences over sets than the restrictions analyzed here.
Finally, Massó and Moreno de Barreda (2011) analyze strategy-proofness in the subdomain
of symmetric single-peaked preferences. After this brief review of the literature, in Section
2, we present notation and definitions. In Section 3, we state the characterization results and
the proofs.
2 Basic Notation and Definitions
Consider a society formed by a finite set of voters N = {1, . . . , n} that select from a finite
set of alternatives A. The alternatives are labelled by consecutive integers and ordered in an
integer segment. That is, for some a, b 2 Z such that a  b,A ⌘ {a, a+1, . . . , b−1, b}.1 Let
R denote the set of all complete, reflexive, and transitive binary relations onA. We call each
element Ri 2 R a preference over alternatives. Each voter is equipped with a preference
over alternatives. We denote by Ri, voter i’s preference. For each Ri we denote by Pi the
associated strict preference relation.
Each voter’s preference over alternatives is restricted to be single-peaked. That is, for
each Ri, there is a unique alternative p(Ri) 2 A –the peak of Ri– such that (i) for each
c 2 A \ {p(Ri)}, p(Ri) Pi c, and (ii) for each c0, c00 2 A, c0 < c00 < p(Ri) or p(Ri) < c00 < c0
imply c00 Pi c0. Let S denote the set of all single-peaked preferences over A.
LetA be the set of pairs of adjacent alternatives,A ⌘ {{c, c0} 2 A \ {b} ⇥ A | c0 = c+ 1}.
The extended set of alternatives, denoted by A ⇢ 2A \ {?}, consists of all of singleton sets
of alternatives and all pairs of adjacent alternatives. That is, A ⌘ A [ A.
Let the order  defined on A be such that (i) for each c, c0 2 A, c  c0 iff {c}{c0}, and
(ii) for each c, (c+1) 2 A, {c}{c, c+1}{c+1}.2 For each pair α, β 2 Awith α  β, we
denote by [α, β] the minimal interval containing α and β, [α, β] ⌘ {γ 2 A | α  γ  β .
For each set C ✓ A, we denote respectively by inf{C} and sup{C} the infimum and thesupremum of C according to the order ,
inf{C} ⌘ {α 2 C | for each α0 2 C, α  α0 , sup{C} ⌘ {β 2 C | for each β0 2 C, β0  β .
Voters’ preferences over the extended set of alternatives are naturally obtained from vot-
ers’ preferences over alternatives. Let D be the set of all complete, reflexive, and transitive
binary relations over A. We call each element %i2 D a preference over sets. For each
%i2 D, ≻i refers to the strict component of %i. We denote by %= (%1, . . . ,%n) 2 DN a
profile of voters’ preferences over sets. For each voter i and each profile of preferences over
sets %, we denote the restriction of % to the voters N \ {i} by %−i.
For each Ri, we say that %i is Ri-consistent if:
(i) for each c, c0 2 A, c Ri c0 iff {c} %i {c0},
(ii) for each {c, c0} 2 A, c Pi c0 iff {c} ≻i {c, c0} ≻i {c0}.
For each Ri 2 S , we denote by D(Ri) the set of all Ri-consistent preferences over sets.3
Finally, we denote by S ⌘ [Ri2SD(Ri) the domain of all consistent preferences over sets,
and SN the set of all profiles of consistent preferences over sets.
1For each c 2 Z such that a  c  b, c 2 A.
2An order on a set X is a complete, reflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric binary relation on X .
3Both conditions on consistent preferences over sets are satisfied by preferences over sets based on Expected
Utility Maximization (Barberà et al., 2001; Ching and Zhou, 2002; Duggan and Schwartz, 2000; Rodríguez-
Álvarez, 2007), leximin preferences (Campbell and Kelly, 2000; Özyurt and Sanver, 2009), and leximax pref-
erences (Ehlers and Gordon, 2013). That is not the case for maximin and maximax preferences (Heo, 2013).
It’s worth to note that for each Ri, D(Ri) is not single–valued.
Lemma 1. For eachRi 2 S , if%i2 S isRi-consistent, then%i is single-peaked with respectto the order .
Proof. Let Ri 2 S , and let %i2 S be such that %i is Ri–consistent. Consider the peak
of Ri, p(Ri). For each c 2 A, p(Ri) Pi c implies that {p(Ri)} ≻i {c}. Since for each
{c, c0} 2 A, c Pi c0 implies {c} ≻i {c, c0} ≻i {c0}, by transitivity, for each α 2 A \ {p(Ri)},
{p(Ri)} ≻i α. Finally, let α, β 2 A\{p(Ri)} be such that α  β  {p(Ri)} and α 6= β. By
%i’s transitivity, {p(Ri)} ≻i β ≻i α. The same argument applies to {p(Ri)}  β  α.
Abusing notation, for each%i2 S , we denote by p(%i) the peak of %i. The set S consists
of all single-peaked preferences over A with peak belonging to the set A.
A minimally extended social choice function is a mapping ϕ : SN ! A such that for
each profile of voters’ consistent preferences over sets selects an element of the extended set
of alternatives.
Since the outcome of a minimally extended social choice function may consist of a set
of two adjacent alternatives, a minimally extended social choice function is a social choice
correspondence with a constrained range. Furthermore, since voters express their preferences
over the outcomes of the social choice, a minimally extended social choice function is a
standard social choice function operating on a restricted domain of preferences.
We conclude this section with two axioms for minimally extended social choice functions.
Strategy-proofness. For each i 2 N , each %2 SN , and each %0i2 S , ϕ(%) %i ϕ(%0i,%−i).
Strategy-proofness implies that a voter cannot obtain a better outcome from the social
choice function by misreporting her preferences. At every preference profile, truth-telling is
a weakly dominant strategy in the induced revelation game.
Unanimity. For each%2 SN , p(%i) = p(%j) = {p⇤} for each i, j 2 N implies ϕ(%) = {p⇤} .
Unanimity implies that if voters’ preferences agree on the same peak, then the social
choice results in the selection of that peak.
3 The Results
We start this section by analyzing an interesting property that simplifies the analysis and it is
widely used in real-life applications. We are interested in minimally extended social choice
functions that only use the information contained in the peaks of voters’ preferences.
Peak-onliness. For each%,%02 SN , p(%i) = p(%0i) for each i 2 N implies ϕ(%) = ϕ(%0) .
Barberà et al. (1993, Theorem 1) prove that in the domain of single-peaked preferences so-
cial choice functions that satisfy strategy-proofness and unanimity also satisfy peak-onliness.
Our first result extends the result to the subdomain S .
Theorem 1. If a minimally extended social choice functionϕ satisfies strategy-proofness and
unanimity, then ϕ satisfies peak-onliness.
Proof. To prove the result, we show that for each i 2 N and each pair of profiles %,%02 SN
such that (i) p(%i) = p(%0i) and (ii) for each j 6= i, %j=%0j , strategy-proofness and unanim-
ity imply ϕ(%) = ϕ(%0). Assume to the contrary that there are i 2 N and %,%02 SN
such that p(%i) = p(%0i) , %j=%0j for each j 2 N \ {i}, and ϕ(%) 6= ϕ(%0). Let X ⌘⇥infj2N{p(%j)}, supj2N{p(%j)}⇤. That is, X is the minimal interval defined by the infimumand the supremum of the voters’ peaks. In addition, suppose that the profiles %,%0 are such
that X is minimal in the sense there are no two pair of profiles that generate a violation of
peak-onliness and such that the minimal interval defined by voters’ peaks is strictly con-
tained in X .4 We prove the result by a series of steps that follow the arguments in the proof
of Barberà et al. (1993, Theorem 1). Step 2 is new and required in Step 3 to solve the cases
involving pairs of adjacent alternatives.
Step 1. ϕ(%) 2 X .
Assume to the contrary that ϕ(%) /2 X . In addition, assume that for each j 2 N ,
ϕ(%)  {p(%j)} . (The symmetric argument applies to the case {p(%j)}  ϕ(%).)
Let %⇤2 SN be such that for each j 2 N , p(%⇤j) = infk2N{p(%k)} and for each
α 2 [ϕ(%), p(%⇤j)] and each β 2 A \ [ϕ(%), pj(%⇤j))], α ≻⇤j β. Let j 2 N . For each α0 2⇥
ϕ(%), p(%⇤j)
⇤
\{ϕ(%)},α0 ≻j ϕ(%). Hence, by strategy-proofness, either ϕ(%⇤j ,%−j) = ϕ(%)
or ϕ(%⇤j ,%−j) /2
⇥
ϕ(%), p(%⇤j)
⇤. Furthermore, for each β0 /2 ⇥ϕ(%), p(%⇤j)⇤, ϕ(%) ≻⇤j β0.
Hence, by strategy-proofness, ϕ(%⇤j ,%−j) %⇤j ϕ(%) and ϕ(%⇤j ,%−j) 2 ⇥ϕ(%), pj(%⇤j)⇤.Thus, ϕ(%⇤j ,%−j) = ϕ(%) . Repeating the argument changing voters’ preferences one at atime, we conclude that ϕ(%⇤) = ϕ(%) which contradicts unanimity.
Without loss of generality, assume that ϕ(%)  ϕ(%0). Denote by Y ⌘ [ϕ(%), ϕ(%0)].
That is, Y is the minimal interval containing both ϕ(%) and ϕ(%0).
Step 2. p(%i) 2 Y \ {ϕ(%), ϕ(%0)}.
By strategy-proofness, ϕ(%) %i ϕ(%0) and ϕ(%0) %0i ϕ(%). Since ϕ(%) 6= ϕ(%0),
ϕ(%) 6= {p(%i)} = {p(%
0
i)} and ϕ(%0) 6= {p(%i)} = {p(%0i)}. Since %0i is single-peaked,if {p(%0i)}  ϕ(%), then ϕ(%) ≻0i ϕ(%0), which contradicts strategy-proofness. The sym-metric argument applies in the case ϕ(%0)  {p(%i)}. Hence, ϕ(%)  {p(%i)}  ϕ(%0) .
Step 3. X = Y .
Assume to the contrary that there is j 2 N with {p(%j)}  ϕ(%) and {p(%j)} 6= ϕ (%).
Let J ⇢ N be the set of voters with infimumpeaks, J ⌘ {k 2 N | {p(%k)} = infk2N{p(%k)} .
By Step 2, i /2 J . We consider two cases: (i) ϕ(%) 2 A, and (ii) ϕ(%) 2 A
4Formally, there is no pair of profiles%,%0 2 SN such that for each j 2 N , p(%j) = p(%0j),ϕ(%) 6= ϕ(%0),
and [infj2N{p(%j)}, supj2N{p(%j)}] ( X .
Assume first that ϕ(%) 2 A. Let α⇤ = ϕ(%). Define % 2 SN be such that (i) for each
j 2 J , p(%j) = α⇤, for each β, γ 2 Y , δ /2 Y , β%jγ if and only if β %j γ, β ≻j δ, and
(ii) for each k 2 N \ J , %k =%k. Let j 2 J . By strategy-proofness, ϕ(%j,%−j)%jϕ(%) =
{p(%j)}. Thus,ϕ(%j,%−j) = ϕ(%). Repeating the argument changing preferences of voters
in J one at a time, we obtain ϕ(%) = ϕ(%). Analogously, let %0 2 SN be such that (i) for
each j 2 J , p(%0j) = α⇤, for each β, γ 2 Y , δ /2 Y , β %0j γ if and only if β %0j γ, β ≻j δ, and
(ii) for each k 2 N \ J , %0k =%0k. Let j 2 J . By strategy-proofness, ϕ(%0j,%0−j)%0jϕ(%0).
Hence, ϕ(%0j,%0−j) 2 Y . Since %0j is single-peaked and {p(%0j)}  ϕ(%)  ϕ(%0), for
each α 2 Y \ {ϕ(%0)}, α ≻0j ϕ(%0). Thus, by strategy-proofness, ϕ(%0j,%0−j) = ϕ(%0).
Repeating the argument, we obtain ϕ(%0) = ϕ(%0). Thus, ϕ(%) 6= ϕ(%0). However, for
each j 2 N , p(%j) = p(%0j), which contradicts the minimality of X .
Finally, assume that ϕ(%) 2 A. Then, ϕ(%) = {c, c + 1} for some c 2 A \ {b}. Let
α⇤ = {c+1}. Let% 2 SN be such that (i) for each j 2 J , p(%j) = α⇤, for eachα 2 Y\{α⇤},
ϕ(%)≻jα, for each β, γ 2 Y \ {ϕ(%), α⇤}, δ /2 Y , β%jγ if and only if β %j γ, β ≻j δ, and
(ii) for each k 2 N \ J , %k =%k. By strategy-proofness, ϕ(%j,%−j)%jϕ(%) = {p(%j)}.
Thus, ϕ(%j,%−j) 2 {ϕ(%), α⇤}. Repeating the argument, we obtain ϕ(%) 2 {ϕ(%), α⇤}.
Analogously, let %0 2 SN be such that (i) for each j 2 J , %0j = %j , and (ii) for each
k 2 N \ J , %0k =%0k. By the same argument of the previous paragraph, ϕ(%0) = ϕ(%0). By
Step 2, ϕ(%0) 6= α⇤. Thus, ϕ(%) 2 {ϕ(%), α⇤} and ϕ(%0) = ϕ(%0), which contradicts the
minimality of X and concludes the proof of Step 3.
The final argument replicates the argument in Step 3. By Step 3, there is j 2 N such
that ϕ(%) = p(%j). Thus, ϕ(%) 2 A. Let J ⌘ {j 2 N, {p(%j)} = ϕ(%)} . Let b% 2 SN
be such that (i) for each j 2 J , p(b%j) = p(%i), for each α 2 [ϕ(%), p(%i)] and each
β /2 [ϕ(%), p(%i)], α b≻j β, and for each α0 2 Y and each β0 /2 Y , α0 b≻j β0, and (ii) for each
k 2 N \ J , b%k =%k. Let j 2 J . By strategy-proofness, ϕ(b%j,%−j)b%jϕ(%) , which implies
ϕ(b%j,%−j) 2 [ϕ(%), p(%i)] . Repeating the argument, we obtain that ϕ(b%) 2 [ϕ(%), p(%i)] .
Finally, let b%0 be such that (i) for each j 2 J , b%0j = b%j , and (ii) for each k 2 N \ J , b%0k =%0k.
Repeating the arguments in Step 3, we obtain ϕ(b%0) = ϕ(%0) . By Step 2, {p(%i)} 6= ϕ(%) .
Thus, inf{(p(%k))k2N 6= inf
n
(p(b%k))k2N
o
= inf
n
(p(b%0k))k2N
o
, inf{(p(%k))k2N 
inf
n
(p(b%k))k2N
o
, and ϕ(b%) 6= ϕ(b%0), which contradicts the minimality of X .
With Theorem 1 at hand, and without loss of generality, we focus on minimally extended
social choice functions that only use the information of the peaks of voters’ preferences. For
each %2 SN , let (p(%1), . . . , p(%n)) 2 AN be the profile of peaks associated to %. We
denote by p = (p1, . . . , pn) 2 AN an arbitrary profile of peaks. For each i 2 N and each
profile of peaks p, pi refers to the peak of i’s preferences, and p−i denotes the restriction of p
to the voters in N \ {i}.
An extended voting scheme is a mapping pi : AN ! A such that for each profile of peaks
selects an element of the extended set of alternatives.
An extended voting scheme is more general than the voting schemes in the standard set-
ting. In our framework, the election may result in an outcome that is not admitted as a valid
peak. We next provide the crucial definition of a family of extended voting schemes.
An extended voting scheme pi is an extended median voter scheme (EMVS) if there is
a family of parameters {aS}S✓N , aS 2 A with aSaT whenever T ✓ S, such that for eachprofile of peaks (p1, . . . , pn)
pi(p1, . . . , pn) = infS✓N {supi2S {pi, aS}} .
Moulin (1980) and Barberà et al. (1993) characterize the family of (extended) voting
schemes that satisfy strategy-proofness when only the potential peaks of the voters can be
selected. EMVSs allow the parameters {aS}S✓N to be located on elements of the extendedset of alternatives that are not admitted as voters’ peaks.
Next, we provide the counterpart to Moulin (1980, Proposition 3) in our framework.
Theorem 2. An extended voting scheme pi satisfies strategy-proofness if and only if pi is an
EMVS.
Proof. We prove sufficiency first. Let pi be an EMVS with parameters {αS}S✓N . Let i 2 N ,
p 2 AN , and %i2 S be such that p(%i) = pi. Let pi(p) = α. If {pi} = α, then for each
p0i 2 A, pi(p) %i pi(p0i, p−i). Assume now that {pi} 6= α. Consider first the case {pi}α.Since pi(p) = α, for each coalition S ✓ N , α  supj2N{pj, aS}. Specifically, for each
S 0 ✓ N with i 2 S 0, either there is j 2 S 0 with α  {pj}, or α  aS0 . Therefore, for
each p0i 2 A, α  pi(p0i, p−i). Since %i is single-peaked, pi(p) %i pi(p0i, p−i). Finally, if
α  {pi}, then there is S ✓ N such that supj2S{pj, aS} = α, and for each S 0 with i 2 S 0,
α  {pi}  supj2S0{pj, aS0}. Therefore, for each p0i, pi(p0i, p−i)  α and pi(p) %i pi(p0i, p−i),which concludes the proof of pi’s strategy-proofness.
We prove necessity by induction on the number of voters. The arguments follow the line
of the proof of Moulin (1980, Proposition 3). We need an additional argument to prove the
result when there is only one voter. Once we prove the simple 1-voter case, the induction
argument replicates the arguments of the proof of Moulin (1980, Proposition 3).
Let N = {i} and pi be an extended voting scheme that satisfies strategy-proofness. Let
api and bpi be, respectively, the infimum and the supremum elements of the range of pi.
Assume first that api = bpi = α. For each pi 2 AN , pi(pi) = α. For each %i2 S ,
pi(pi) = inf{α, sup{pi, α}} = α. Let a{?} = aN = α, and pi is an EMVS.
Assume now that api 6= bpi. We prove first that the range of pi is [api, bpi]. Assume to the
contrary that there is c 2 A such that {c} 2 [api, bpi], but for each pi 2 A, pi(pi) 6= {c}. Let
%i2 S with p(%i) = {c} and assume that pi(c)  {c}. (The symmetric argument applies to
the case {c}  pi(c).) Let%0i2 S with p(%0i) = c be such that for eachα, β 2 A\{c}, {c}  αand β  {c} imply α ≻0i β. Since bpi is in the range of pi, there is p00i such that pi(p00i ) = bpi.Then, pi(p00i ) = bpi ≻0i pi(c), which contradicts strategy-proofness. Note that by strategy-proofness, for each%i2 S , pi(p(%i)) = {α 2 [api, bpi] | for each α0 2 [api, bpi], α %i α0}. There-
fore, for each pi 2 A, if {pi}  api, then pi(pi) = api. If {pi} 2 [api, bpi], then pi(pi) =
{pi}. Finally, if bpi  {pi}, then pi(pi) = bpi. Therefore, for each pi 2 A, pi(pi) =
inf{bpi, sup{pi, api}}. Just by relabelling a{?} = bpi and aN = api, pi is an EMVS.
Induction Basis. If there is a n 2 N such that for each n0  n, for each society N =
{1, . . . , n0} every extended voting scheme pi : AN ! A that satisfies strategy-proofness
is an EMVS, then for each society N 0 = {1, . . . , n, n + 1}, every extended voting scheme
pi0 : AN
0
! A that satisfies strategy-proofness is an EMVS.
Let N = {1, . . . , n + 1} and let pi : AN ! A be an (n + 1)-voter voting scheme
that satisfies strategy-proofness. Let i 2 N and pi 2 A, and define the auxiliary n-voter
extended voting scheme pii : AN\{i} ! A in such a way that for each restricted profile of
peaks p−i 2 AN\{i}, pii(p−i) ⌘ pi(pi, p−i). Since pi satisfies strategy-proofness, pii is a n-
voter extended voting scheme that satisfies strategy-proofness. By the induction hypothesis,
pii is an n-voter EMVS. Hence, for each p−i 2 AN\{i},
pi(pi, p−i) = pii(p−i) = infS✓N\{i} {supj2S{pj, aS(pi} .
Let S0 ✓ N \ {i} and consider p˜−i 2 AN\{i} such that for each j 2 S0, p˜j = a, and for
each j0 /2 S0, p˜j0 = b. Then, pi(pi, p˜−i) = pii(p˜−i) = aS0(pi).
Let p0i 2 A such that p0i 6= pi. Let the auxiliary n-voter voting scheme pi0i : AN\{i} ! Abe such that for each restricted profile of peaks p−i 2 AN\{i}, pii(p−i) ⌘ pi(pi, p−i). By
the induction hypothesis, pi0i is an EMVS. Repeating the argument of the previous paragraph,
pi(p0i, p˜−i) = pi
0
i(p˜−i) = aS0(p
0
i).
Since for each pi 2 A, aS0(pi) = pi(pi, p˜−i), we can define aS0 : A ! A as an 1-voter extended voting scheme. Since pi satisfies strategy-proofness, aS0 satisfies strategy-proofness. By the induction hypothesis, there are two constants, αS0 , βS0 , with αS0  βS0 ,such that aS0(pi) = inf {βS0 , sup{pi, αS0}}. Thus,
pi(pi, p−i) = pii(p−i) = infS0✓N\{i}
{supj2S0 {pj, inf {βS0 , sup{pi, αS0}}  .
For each S0 ✓ N \ {i}, let p¯S0 = supj2S0{pj},
supj2S0
{
pj, inf {βS0 , sup{pi, αS0}}
 
= sup{p¯S0 , inf {βS0 , sup{pi, αS0}} =
= inf{sup{p¯S0 , βS0}, sup{p¯S0 , pi, αS0}}.
By relabelling for each S0 ✓ N \ {i}, aS0 = βS0 and aS0[{i} = αS0 , we obtain,
pi(p) = infS0✓N\{i}
{inf{sup{p¯S0 , βS0}, sup{p¯S0 , pi, αS0}} = infS✓N {supj2S {pj, aS} .
From Theorem 1 and 2, and noting that α{?} = b and αN = a are necessary and sufficient
for an EMVS to satisfy unanimity, we obtain our final and main characterization result.
Theorem 3. A minimally extended social choice function ϕ satisfies unanimity and strategy-
proofness if and only if ϕ is an EMVS with α{?} = b and αN = a.
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